Labelling NATO’s operation in Afghanistan as a success is far from reality. However, let's not delude ourselves into thinking that today's Afghanistan, under the Taliban’s oppressive regime, is any better.
In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. rallied a broad coalition of Western allies to intervene in Afghanistan. Their aim was to eliminate Al-Qaeda, responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and to depose the Taliban for harbouring them; George W. Bush himself asserted that the Taliban is “not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists”. These initial aims were carried out with relative ease. Within only a few months, Al-Qaeda had been crippled, and the subsequent toppling of the Taliban was met with warm welcome by the U.S.-led coalition. This rapid success, however, was deceptively straightforward, masking the complexities that would soon emerge.
The Western forces soon faced a 'Vietnam syndrome'—an uncertainty and loss of direction post-victory. With the Taliban ousted and Al-Qaeda in disarray, the mission's purpose became murky, leading to strategic drift and a lack of clear objectives. In the U.S., dealing with the aftermath of Afghanistan was swiftly moved down in their long list of foreign policy priorities. Isolationists and fiscal conservatives, like Donald Rumsfeld, dominated the Bush administration’s discourse, vehemently opposing extended 'nation-building' efforts. Their influence resulted in a shift away from long-term stabilisation plans. For Rumsfeld, ‘win and then leave’ was the optimal strategy; demonstrated by a reluctance for staying in the region other than for military purposes. This sentiment seemingly echoed with other policymakers and strategists across the Western world. Moreover, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 diverted critical resources, including military personnel, funding, and political attention, away from Afghanistan. This left the country under-resourced and hindered comprehensive nation-building efforts. The simultaneous wars stretched the U.S. military thin and diluted the focus necessary for successful stabilisation in Afghanistan.
Consequently, efforts to promote stability in Afghanistan were insufficient. By not committing enough troops, Rumsfeld's strategy left vast areas of Afghanistan inadequately secured. This allowed the Taliban to regroup and launch insurgencies from rural areas. The lack of a strong security presence undermined efforts to establish law and order, contributing to the country's instability. Political opposition to nation-building back home, from figures such as Rumsfeld, meant that resources were scarce, and personnel structures were weak and understaffed. Resource scarcity led to problems for the local economy, limiting growth in sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing, which were in dire need of boosts to productivity. Poor staffing meant that government institutions were weak and failed to foster effective administration. The latter is particularly notable, eroding trust from the general public of Afghanistan in NATO’s ability to help the country rebuild.
Yet, the issues with nation-building in Afghanistan went deeper than a mere lack of interest; the crux was that the theories were wrong. And by theories, I mean the assumptions on which the NATO coalition was operating. The coalition employed a top-down approach to nation-building in Afghanistan, which prioritised military hegemony over community cooperation. The idea was that by building a secure state that is militarily and diplomatically backed by the West, grassroots support would eventually surge.
This proved to be a deeply flawed strategy. As rightly pointed out by the RAND counterinsurgency study, nation-building should be about “teaching people to fish”, rather than fishing for them. In this case, while we could have offered funding, training, and other forms of support, the rebuilding of institutions in Afghanistan should have been left to the Afghans themselves. This becomes even more vital when we consider the socio-political context of Afghanistan, a country historically plagued by high levels of sectarianism. Unlike many Western nation-states, Afghanistan is a country that hosts a vast array of ethnic and religious communities, often referred to as “tribes”, which makes it difficult to determine a unitary national identity. The people of Afghanistan are primarily connected through the mere fact of geography. Of course, attempting to unite such a country through the immediate construction of a wide-reaching hegemonic state was always destined to fail. In the U.S. Afghanistan stabilisation strategy report, this mistake is stated candidly: “The stabilization strategy and the programs used to achieve it were not properly tailored to the Afghan context”.
Thus, a counterinsurgency strategy which was based around community engagement and local involvement might have achieved far better outcomes. By encouraging native citizens’ and tribal leaders’ involvement in decision-making processes, decisions would be more well-received by the population, as the rebuilding of the country would be driven by initiatives that were more culturally sensitive. For such a “bottom-up” rebuilding strategy to work, Western states have been required to demonstrate a willingness to work alongside tribal leaders in the country. Unfortunately, such a willingness was absent. Traditions such as the “ Loya Jirga”, which is a political meeting among the tribal and religious leaders of Afghanistan were not included in NATO’s rebuilding strategy. Perhaps an expansion of the Jirga, with special considerations for democracy and human rights might have been more effective.
Nonetheless, with NATO opting for the “top-down” hegemonic strategy, the Taliban were easily able to push the narrative that the coalition were overseas invaders that merely wished to assert their dominance in the country. Over time, the Taliban gained more territorial control, particularly in rural areas where Western presence was low. In Western states, support for continued involvement in Afghanistan continued to fall, with the operation being labelled by many as a “forever war”. In August 2021, the U.S. withdrew completely from Afghanistan, followed by the UK. The Taliban swiftly regained control of Kabul and with it established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Nowadays, under the Taliban, human rights are not exactly ubiquitous. Women and girls face gender persecution, being banned from secondary education and prohibited from several public spaces. Religious minorities face widespread oppression, and public executions have made a return. The current situation is nothing short of devastating, and we must distinctly acknowledge our role in the playing out of these events. While overthrowing the Taliban and debilitating Al-Qaeda were incredible feats, Western post-war planning was plainly insufficient. The focus on immediate military objectives meant that long-term infrastructure projects and governance reforms were deprioritized. This oversight prevented the establishment of robust institutions necessary for a stable and self-sufficient Afghanistan.
In the future, nation-building and counterinsurgency operations should be characterised by “bottom-up” strategies that aim to empower communities, work alongside local leaders, and reform existing institutions, rather than an imposition of our own institutions. As Western states confront a growing array of foreign policy challenges in Ukraine, Taiwan, Gaza, and Sudan, it is crucial to learn from past experiences to avoid repeating previous mistakes.